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Evolution of PES
As an alternative to the “command-and-control” approach,
increasing enthusiasm for market-based instruments (MBI) in
environmental management arose in the early 80s. It was
hoped that MBI, including packaging taxes, effluent taxes and
charges, capital or operation subsidies, tradable permits,
deposit-refund schemes, performance bonds, liability
instruments, and many others, would reduce the cost of
achieving environmental goals and distribute resources in
more efficient ways. The 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development endorsed the use of MBIs as
an important component of sustainable development. 
The principles behind MBI attempt to capture the financial
value of environmental services through so-called ‘payments
for environmental services’ (PES). Four types of PES schemes
can be distinguished and differentiated by the degree of
government intervention in administration of the schemes,
by characterising the buyers and sellers, and by the source of
payments: (1) private payment schemes; (2) cap-and-trade
schemes, under a regulatory cap or floor; (3) certification
schemes for environmental goods; (4) public payment
schemes, including fiscal mechanisms. Over the past
decades, a range of payment mechanisms for environmental
services have been operating in Latin American, the US and
Europe. 
In the early 2000s, the Payment for Environmental Services
(PES) concept was tested as an efficient  for solving
environmental problems in Asian and African developing
countries. Advocates of effectiveness and efficiency of the
PES approach tend to see “environmental service
transactions” in economic terms and generally prefer the
term “payments” (Wunder 2005). However, the application of
PES mechanisms should balance effectiveness and efficiency
with fairness and pro-poor characteristics, with transaction
costs as obstacles to both. Proponents of fairness and equity
dimensions tend to prefer the use of the broader concept of
‘rewards’ (RES).1
Van Noordwijk et al (2006) mention four criteria with
indicators in developing RES schemes. They should be
realistic, voluntary, conditional and pro-poor. Very few active
programmes strictly follow these criteria due to social,
political and natural factors affecting transactions and the
system in which they operate. Because of this, a list of sub-
criteria is presented for quality control (van Noordwijk et al
2007) (Table 1). 
Criteria Sub-criteria
A. Effective,  efficient and sustainable: 
- Realistic ü Shared common perspective of the issue
ü Value to beneficiaries is substantial
ü Opportunity costs can be covered and 
access to resources improved
ü Threats can be monitored and evaluated
- Voluntary ü Legitimacy at individual level
ü Free and prior consent applied
ü Adaptiveness of mechanism
- Conditional ü Trust is enhanced
ü Sanctions exist
ü Environmental change is taken into 
account 
B. Equitable 
- Pro-poor ü Aligned with MDGs and sustainable 
development objectives
ü Rewards reduce vulnerabilities of the 
poor 
The first three indicators capture ‘market’ and ‘economic’
aspects of the scheme related to the effectiveness,
efficiency and sustainability of the RES institutions. A scheme
is effective when the reward slightly exceeds the amount
land managers are willing to accept to take actions in
providing ES, but less than the willingness and ability of ES
beneficiaries to pay. Special attention is given to the
ecological basis of environmental service agreements: the
mechanism should be based on real cause-effect relations
between land use and environmental services to ensure its
sustainability (van Noordwijk et al 2005; de Groot et al
2006).The last two indicators relate to the equity dimension
of the schemes to understand the relations between poverty
and ES provision and to develop pro-poor mechanisms. 
The pro-poor nature of a RES scheme can be interpreted from
either a design or a poverty impact perspective. RES
strategies can be deliberately designed to be biased in favour
of the poor when considering tradeoffs between the
efficiency and fairness of the mechanisms employed. From a
poverty impact perspective, a RES can be assessed by its
1 In this paper, we consistently use ‘rewards for environmental services (RES)’ for our concepts and findings and ‘payment for environmental services (PES)’ for other special cases fo-
cused on financial transactions. 
Farmers joining participatory water monitoring in Sumberjaya, Lampung, Indonesia.
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Table 1: Key criteria and sub-criteria for effective, efficient, sustainable and equitable
PES
Feature
proposition on how non-financial incentives can make
important contributions to local livelihoods, which was
especially clear in the case of conditional land tenure in one
of our pilot sites.2 Moreover, literature on collective action
in natural resource management indicates that social capital
of community members influences the magnitude of
transaction costs. Higher levels of social cohesion and trust
within the community and its external linkages are
associated with lower transaction costs. This suggests that
investments providing non-financial benefits to communities,
such as strengthening social capital, can help reduce overall
costs of RES implementation.
Another ICRAF study on the impact of PES highlights the need
for awareness of the social dynamics between participants
and non-participants and to design benefit packages that
minimise jealousy and conflict (Leimona et al 2009b). The
case studies reveal that the role of the intermediary is very
important and dominant in any PES scheme in developing
countries, mostly because of the limited capability of the ES
providers for managing direct payments. Honest and trusted
intermediaries are therefore one of the key factors of
success. Furthermore, the role of government as regulator
should be more pronounced and explicit. Indeed, the PES
concept was new to all relevant stakeholders, including
government and buyers, which created a challenge in gaining
their commitment.  
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contribution to poverty reduction through payments that
actually reach poor land users or poor ES providers (Hope et
al. 2005; Noordwijk et al. 2007). 
Furthermore, a conditional RES must ensure transparency. In
designing a RES, solving problems at local levels related to
voluntary participation and conditionality can help make the
whole process more effective. Beyond that, the roles of
intermediaries and buyers are also very important in ensuring
that the RES is realistic and pro-poor.
Some lessons from RES initiatives in Asia
An ICRAF study on RES initiatives in Asia showed that these
schemes were quite heterogeneous in the types of poverty,
landscape characteristics and environmental services
provided (Leimona et al 2009a). The implementation of RES
differed according to socio-cultural backgrounds in the study
area, and in their models for involvement of local
communities. ICRAF also assessed local people’s perpective
of factors influencing poverty in view of developing a RES
payment approach.
One requisite of pro-poor RES design is to identify rewards
that match with people’s needs and expectations. From our
analysis, we concluded that rewards in the forms of human
capital, social capital and physical capital – or what are often
referred to as non-financial incentives – are very often the
most preferred and also the most feasible. This supports our
2  http://www.worldagroforestrycentre.org/Sea/Networks/RUPES/download/SiteProfiles/RUPES-Sumberjaya_FINAL.pdf 
Mountainous landscape of Kulekhani providing watershed services. Photo: Shyam Upadhyaya.
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In conclusion, the application of payments for environmental
services in developing countries has experienced shifting
perspectives, from legitimating cost-efficient and effective
natural resource management to concerns about equity and
fairness of the scheme. Practitioners in this field have
experienced that markets alone cannot solve the problems of
environmental services degradation. The effective
functioning of PES mechanisms requires redefinition of its
rules, government regulation and better enforcement.
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